



The Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: Roots and Factors

M. Afif Anshori

Universitas Islam Negeri Raden Intan Lampung
afifanshori@radenintan.ac.id

Abstract: *Radicalism has become one of the recent world problems faced by many countries, including Indonesia. The radical movement in this country is growing rapidly, especially after the reformation era. The spirit of democracy has provided opportunities for radical Islamic groups to express their beliefs openly and use religious symbols in their religious and social movements. This article aims to analyze the historical roots of radicalism in Indonesia and the factors that influence it. This article uses descriptive qualitative methods. The results of the study indicate that the radical movement in Indonesia can be traced from the tendency of groups trying to realize the Islamic State system (the Khilafah) in Indonesia. This tendency can be found in several radical groups such as Darul Islam (DI/TII), Jama'ah Islamiyah, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Fisabilillah, Islamic Defender Fronts (FPI), and Preparatory Committee for the Application of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI). The study concludes that radicalism in Indonesia is the response of Muslims to the social, economic, and political conditions of Muslims in Indonesia.*

Keywords : *Islamic Radicalism, Muslim, Politic, Trans-nasional Ideology, Indonesia*

Abstrak : *Radikalisme merupakan salah satu persoalan yang dihadapi berbagai negara di dunia dewasa ini, tak terkecuali Indonesia. Gerakan radikalism di Negara ini mengalami perkembangan cukup pesat pasca reformasi. Semangat demokrasi telah memberi peluang kepada kelompok-kelompok Islam radikal untuk mengekspresikan keyakinan mereka terang-terangan dan menggunakan simbol-simbol agama dalam gerakan keagamaan maupun sosial mereka. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis akar sejarah radikalisme di Indonesia serta faktor yang*

mempengaruhinya. Artikel ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa paham radikalisme di Indonesia bisa dilacak dari ideologi gerakan keagamaan Islam yang ingin mewujudkan Negara Islam atau pun sistem khilafah di Indonesia. Gerakan tersebut antara lain Darul Islam (DI/TII), Jama'ah Islamiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Fisabilillah, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), dan Komitee Persiapan Penerapan Syariah Islam (KPPSI). Hasil kajian menyimpulkan bahwa radikalisme di Indonesia merupakan respons umat Islam terhadap kondisi sosial dan politik umat Islam di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci : *Radikalism Islam, Politik, Ideologi Trans-nasional, Indonesia*

A. Introduction

Radicalism has become one of the recent world problems faced by almost all countries, including Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, the radicalism movement developed rapidly, especially after the reformation era. The discourse of democratization and human rights at this time gives everyone the freedom to express their thoughts. This has become an important momentum for a group of radical Muslims to uphold religious symbols, both in the form of da'wah and other social activities. Even some of them explicitly urge to establish a state based on Islamic Sharia called the Islamic State of Indonesia.

In many cases, the emergence of radicalism was triggered by domestic problems and the constellation of international politics. Domestic problems refer to various social crises that occurred since the massacre of the Kiai by magicians until the Poso tragedy (December 25, 1998) and the Ambon tragedy (January 19, 1999), in which Muslims were victims. In addition, there is also a consensus among Indonesian political observers that all inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence in recent years has been triggered by power struggles between rival elite factions, or deliberately created by certain factions, to destabilize the government. There is no doubt that competition between elites is a major destabilizing factor that provokes many outbreaks of violence conducted by civilian interest groups which were backed financially by the military elite. This, however, does not mean that all radical groups committing violence are merely puppets or tools in the hands of immoral political manipulators. In

many cases, most of them emerge independently as a result of economy or political issues.

The scholars have a different opinion in viewing the rise of political Islam in Indonesia. John L. Esposito, for instance, equates the term political Islam with Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic movements.¹ While Oliver Roy tends to interpret political Islam as the activities of groups who believe in Islam as a religion and at the same time as political ideologies or activist groups that consider Islam as much as political ideologies rather than Religion.² He also terms the phenomena as the neo-fundamentalism movement. In the academic circle and mass media, the term radicalism is generally used to denote political Islamic movements that have negative connotations such as "extreme, militant, intolerant" and "anti-Western/American."

Sidney Jones asserts that radical movement in Indonesia as real phenomena, in spite of its small number.³ Whereas Greg Barton adds that the first religious radicalism in Indonesia was marked by the emergence of the Darul Islam movement (DI/TII) in the early 1950s. Although in 1962 the DI/TII movement was successfully suppressed by the Indonesian Government, but their influence had already received support from several groups of Indonesian Muslims. The leader of the newly formed group then continuously spread the seeds of radicalism in Indonesia;⁴ Among them is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the founder of Darul Islam in Solo.⁵ It was in this period that some groups such as DI/NII (Darul Islam/Negara Islam

¹ John L. Esposito, ed., *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1997): 203.

² Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994): 246.

³ Sahri Sahri, "Radikalisme Islam Di Perguruan Tinggi Perspektif Politik Islam," *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Perundangan Islam* 6, no. 1 (1 April 2016): 237-68, <https://doi.org/10.15642/ad.2016.6.1.237-268>.

⁴ Zulfadli, "Radikalisme Islam dan Motif Terorisme di Indonesia," *AKADEMIKA: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* Vol. 22, no. 1 (2017): 173-98.

⁵ Greg Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist Thought in Indonesia," in *Greg Barton in The Combating Terrorism at West Point Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia*, Scott Helfstein (Ed), *Southeast Asia Project, 2009.*, ed. Scott Helfstein (New York: Department of Social Sciences and an Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy at West Point, 2009): 34-35.

Indonesia), *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (IM), *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), and other radical groups emerge; whereas, a group which later on known *Jamaah Islamiyah* remained "underground".

The development of the radicalism movement in Indonesia was not only influenced by the domestic factor but it was also influenced by external factors. As Barton asserts, the influence of Wahhabism in Indonesia is inseparable from the characters of Muhammad Nasir, the founder of the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) who provides scholarships for students to continue their studies at Ibn Saud University. The collaboration of DDII with the Ibnu Saud university then establishes the Arabic Language Institute-LPBA or better known LIPIA.⁶ One of the alumni of LIPIA is Ja'far Umar Thalib, the caretaker and leader of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlusunnah Wal-Jamaah (FKAWJ). Thus, the collaboration of Darul Islam and LIPIA has become an embryo of the growth of radical Islam in Indonesia, both structurally and culturally.

The political Islam movement experienced the lowest point during the New Order, especially when the regime became increasingly authoritarian and marginalized Islam. The repression expanded in 1985 when the government enacted Law No. 8/1985 requiring all social organizations to use Pancasila as their sole principle. Needless to say, this policy provokes tension between the government and some popular Islamic organizations.⁷ Among the Islamic figures who strongly opposed the uniformity of ideology and politics in the New Order era were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the leaders of *Jama'ah Islamiyah* who fled to Malaysia in April 1985.⁸ With the breakdown of the New Era regime, *Jama'ah Islamiyah* started to design and to create a country based on Islamic law (the *Hilafah*) in Indonesia. To realize this dream, they carried out "jihad" activities, starting from secretly member recruitment until carrying out actions in several areas.⁹

⁶ *Ibid*, 36.

⁷ Haedar Nashir, *Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Ma'arif Institut, 2013): 279.

⁸ Zulfadli, "Radikalisme Islam dan Motif Terorisme di Indonesia."

⁹ Nashir, *Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia...*: 280.

Many studies have been conducted on radicalism in Indonesia. Some studies focus on genealogical and historical aspects; Other studies try to uncover the phenomena from the perspective of the movement and its thinking. Some highlight the link between radicalism and political developments, especially after the breakdown of New Order; While others try to analyze the link between radicalism and terrorism that later emerged in Indonesia. The scholars using the first approach are Martin van Bruinessen,¹⁰ Abd A'la,¹¹ Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar,¹² Sun Choirul Ummah,¹³ Zaki Mubarak and Ahmad Fauzi,¹⁴ Ahmad Asrori.¹⁵ While the scholars using the last perspective are Masdar Hilmi,¹⁶ Ibrahim,¹⁷ Abdul Mukti Rouf,¹⁸ Choirul Mahfud,¹⁹ Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif,²⁰ Muhammad Sirozi,²¹ Akh. Muzakki,²² and Vedi R. Hadiz.²³

¹⁰ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 10, no. 2 (1 Juli 2002): 117–54, <https://doi.org/10.5367/00000002101297035>.

¹¹ Abd A'la, "The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia: A Study of The Roots and Characteristics of The Padri Movement," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* Vol. 12, no. 2 (2008).

¹² Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar, "Melacak Akar Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* Vol. 14, no. 2 (November 2010): 169–86.

¹³ Sun Choirul Ummah, "Akar Radikalisme Islam Di Indonesia," *HUMANIKA: Kajian Ilmiah Matakuliah Umum* Vol. 12, no. 1 (2012), <https://doi.org/10.21831/hum.v12i1.3657>.

¹⁴ Zaki Mubarak dan Ahmad Fauzi, "The Rise of Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Review of Islam in SouthEast Asia* Vol. 1, no. 1 (t.t.): 2018.

¹⁵ Ahmad Asrori, "Radikalisme Di Indonesia: Antara Historisitas Dan Antropisitas," *KALAM* Vol. 9, no. 2 (2015): 253–68.

¹⁶ Masdar Hilmi, "Radikalisme Agama dan Politik Demokrasi di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru," *Miqot* Vol. XXXIX, no. 2 (2015).

¹⁷ Ibrahim Ibrahim, Dini Wulansari, dan Novendra Hidayat, "Radicalism in Indonesia and The Reflective Alternatives to Reduce," *PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 3, no. 3 (2017): 1554–64.

¹⁸ Abdul Mukti Rouf, "Mengurai Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru," *Ulumuna: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* Vol. XI, no. 1 (2007).

¹⁹ Choirul Mahfud dkk., "Religious Radicalism, Global Terrorism and Islamic Challenges in Contemporary Indonesia," *Jurnal Sosial Humaniora* 11, no. 1 (2018): 8–18, <https://doi.org/10.12962/j24433527.v11i1.3550>.

²⁰ Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, "Agama, Terorisme, dan Peran Negara," *Ma'arif: Arus Pemikiran Islam dan Sosial* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2013).

²¹ Muhammad Sirozi, "The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia, dalam The Muslim World," *The Muslim World*, Januari 2015.

This article aims to describe the historical roots of the radicalism movement in Indonesia and analyze the factors that influence its existence in Indonesia. This work differs from many studies, particularly which concentrate on Islamic religious doctrine and ignores the developing socio-political aspects. Such an analysis is certainly unfair because it places the teachings of Islam as a source of conflicts whereas religious radical phenomena occur not only among Muslims but also happens among the following of other religions. This study uses a qualitative descriptive approach, utilizing books, journals, documents, news, and other study materials both in printed and online.

B. Islamic Radicalism

Etymologically, the word *radical* means *root* or *basis*. Radical also means someone who holds radical views both in political and religious contexts. Radicalism means belief in radical ideas and principles.²⁴ Karyadi defines radicalism as a flow or ideology that arises through the process of recognition, planting, appreciation, and reinforcement. This process is called radicalization. If radicalization goes well, then radicals become ideologies or *isms* so that they become radicalism.²⁵

In Indonesia, radical Muslims can be identified from several indicators, namely: 1. Regard the Indonesian government as *thoghut* (Evil); 2. Reject the national flag and anthem; 3. Having a strong, emotional bond among the group members rather than emotional ties with the family, campus, and work; 4. Activities are conducted secretly and moving from place to place; 5. Paying the ransom for sins; 6. Using distinctive dress such as dress, pants and beards and veils for women; 7.

²² Akh. Muzakki, "The Roots, Strategies, and Popular Perception of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2014).

²³ Vedi R. Hadiz, "Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 38, no. 4 (2008): 638–47.

²⁴ A.S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, Cet. XI (London: Oxford University Press, 1983): 1032.

²⁵ Karwadi Karwadi, "Deradikalisasi Pemahaman Ajaran Islam," *Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 14, no. 1 (1 Mei 2014): 139–56, <https://doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v14i1.71>.

Consider Muslims outside their group as wicked and infidel; 8. Being reluctant to listen to the people outside their group.²⁶

Azyumardy Azra mapped the radical movement into two typologies, namely: pre-modern era, presented by the Wahabi movement and the contemporary era, presented by the Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM). Both talk more about the depravity of modernity and therefore reject it. Azra also identifies the existence of a new tendency of reviving classical radicalism (the *Khawarij*) holding the motto *there is no law, except the law of God*.²⁷ This tendency is also reflected in romanticism, glorifying the Muslim's achievement in the golden era and assuming that current Muslims backwardness because they abandon the teachings of Islam.²⁸

Many revivalist groups used the religious issue as a way of gaining power and seizing social influence in society. As Haedar Nashir noted in his dissertation, there are three kinds of radical groups seeking radical change by means of exploiting religious teachings. *First*, the revivalists characterized by legal-formal tendencies demand changes in the legal system to follow the rules and guidelines of religious law. *Second*, the revivalists characterized by doctrinal tendency considers religious doctrines as absolute and rigid. *Third*, the revivalists characterized by a militant tendency show intolerant attitude toward other believers.²⁹

C. The Development of the Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: From DI/TII to ISIS

As explained earlier, the term Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is used to denote Islamic groups in Indonesia who have a literal religious understanding and radical actions. These movements have ideological similarities, wanting to make Islam the main pillar of the nation and state,

²⁶ Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid, "Peta Gerakan Radikalisme Di Indonesia" (Workshop Membangun Kesadaran dan Strategi Menghadapi Radikalisasi Agama, Palu, Mei 2012): 3.

²⁷ Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalism, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996): 113.

²⁸ Mukhibat, "Meneguhkan Kembali Pesantren Dalam Merajut Lokalitas, Nasionalitas, Dan Globalitas," *KARSA: Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* Vol. 23, no. 2 (2015): 177-92, <https://doi.org/10.19105/karsa.v23i2.717>.

²⁹ Nashir, *Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis Di Indonesia ...*: 132-8.

and, at a more extreme stage, projecting the formation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII).

The idea of establishing the Indonesian Islamic State was first echoed by the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo in the 1940s. Initially, DI was a political organization that had a military wing and joined in the struggle against the Dutch invaders with the Indonesian Armed Forces/ABRI, now Indonesian National Army (TNI).³⁰ But then, in 1949, after Indonesia gained full sovereignty, DI still retained its troops and fought to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). According to Wahid, DI tried to turn the nation-state into a religious state, replace the ideology of the Pancasila with its Islamic version or even get rid of the Republic of Indonesia and replace it with the *Khilafah Islamiyah*.³¹

In subsequent developments, DI gave birth to several groups, one of which was Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI was an ideological organization or movement led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir that intended to establish the *Khilafah Islamiyah* in Indonesia. In 1985, the two figures fled to Malaysia to avoid capture by the New Order regime and developed JI there. JI's long-term goal is to establish the Daulah Islamiyah/Islamic State in the Southeast Asian region, which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei.³²

After the fall of the New Order Regime in 1998, Indonesia underwent a major change in the nation and state system which was marked by the emergence of an era of public freedom (democracy) and the reappearance of the Khilafah supporters.³³ The end of the New Order regime, according to Boy, is often seen as the starting point where Islamic groups reappear in contemporary Indonesian history.³⁴ This periods

³⁰ Luqman Hakim, *Terorisme Indonesia* (Surakarta: FSIS, 2004): 48.

³¹ Abdurrahman Wahid, "Musuh Dalam Sleimut," in *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Jakarta: Wahid Institut, 2009):18.

³² Hakim, *Terorisme Indonesia...: 49.*

³³ Komaruddin Hidayat, *Kontroversi Khilafah Islam, Negara, Dan Pancasila* (Jakarta: Mizan, 2014): 19.

³⁴ Pradana Boy ZTF, *Fikih Jalan Tengah: Dialektika Hukum Islam Dan Masalah-Masalah Masyarakat Modern*, ed. D. Indirani (Jakarta: Penerbit Hamdalah, 2008): 154.

showed the growth of communal and primordial identity marked by the emergence of new parties and mass organizations that carry primordial symbols, such as religion, as well as the emergence of Islamic movements that aspire to establish the *Khilafah Islamiyah*.³⁵ This fact proves William R. Liddle's thesis that when the political system after the New Order changed, the Islamic scripturalist found a metamorphic momentum of its rise.³⁶

It was in this era that a number of groups emerged aimed at alienating people from the secular system and trying to uphold Islamic Sharia. Among these groups were Laskar Jihad - which later formed the Ahlus-Sunnah Waljama'ah Communication Forum (FKAWJ), Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Fisabilillah, Islamic Sharia Implementation Preparation Committee (KPPSI), Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other groups, including Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. JI then expanded its space to develop the idea of establishing an Islamic State. This group then changed its name to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which later changed again to Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).³⁷

The above groups massively and effectively spread their ideas to the wider community. Through jargon, such as: defending Islam, applying sharia, as well as establishing the *Khilafah Islamiyah*, this movement seeks to win the sympathy of Muslims, especially from those who do not have a deep understanding of religious teachings.³⁸

The same jargon and expressions are echoed by activists of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which aim to gain the sympathy of Muslims through propaganda jihad. ISIS not only succeeded in gaining sympathy from people who did not have a deep understanding of Islam but also succeeded in winning sympathy from a number of Islamic groups and movements.

³⁵ Ridwan Al-Makassary, *Terorisme Berjubah Agama* (Jakarta: Pusat Bahasa dan Budaya UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta dan Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2003): 20.

³⁶ William R. Liddle, "Scriptualism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia," in *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, ed. Mark R. Woodward (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996): 326-356.

³⁷ Azyumardi Azra, *Republika*, October 2002: 3.

³⁸ Wahid, "Musuh Dalam Selimut." ...: 90.

As stated by As'ad Said Ali, former Deputy Head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), ISIS already has a network in Indonesia. The network is called Jamaah Ansharul Daulat (JAD) which is a combination of a number of groups and Islamic revivalism movements that previously existed in Indonesia. JAD consists of several factions, such as Jamaah Ansharul Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK), East Indonesian Mujahidin (MIT), and West Indonesian Mujahidin (MIB), and Al-Muhajirun groups which are fragments of the Hizb ut-Tahrir group.³⁹

The starting point for the Indonesian government's response to ISIS issues and threats in Indonesia was stimulated by the emergence of a video on Youtube entitled *Join the Ranks*. The person who appeared in the video was Abu Muhammad Al-Indonesia who quoted many verses to invite Indonesian Muslims to conduct jihad in Iraq and Syria. Abu Muhammad or Bahrum Syah is a network of Al-Muhajirun organizations that are trying to form a global network by advocating groups that support the enforcement of Islamic law, even radically.⁴⁰ In responding to the video, the Government of Indonesia stated that ISIS was banned in Indonesia.

The first branch of the pro ISIS organization was based in the United Kingdom, which came to be called "Islamic UK" or "Uk Sharia". Then in each country they formed a new branch by attaching the word "Sharia". In Indonesia, for instance, It became "Sharia Indonesia" which was founded in 2010. The Islamic revivalism group or movement inspired by Al-Muhajirun then became a pro-ISIS network in Indonesia including the Tauhid wal Jamaah Group (TJW) led by Aman Abdurrahman, Activity Forum Sharia Islam (FAKSI) led by M. Fachry, MIT led by Santoso, MIB, and JAT led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. These groups were the first to declare their support for ISIS, especially after switching to IS on June 29, 2014. To spread the ideology of ISIS in Indonesia, Fachry created a website called *Al*

³⁹ Dani Prabowo, "Mantan Wakil Kepala BIN Sebut ISIS Punya Jaringan Baru di Indonesia," KOMPAS.com, March 22, 2015, <https://surabaya.kompas.com/read/2015/03/22/14022091/Mantan.Wakil.Kepala.BIN.Sebut.ISIS.Punya.Jaringan.Baru.di.Indonesia>.

⁴⁰ "Evolusi ISIS di Indonesia" (Institut for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), 24 September 2014).

Mustaqbal (www.almustaqbal.net), and a magazine with the same name, as a campaign media for Sharia Indonesia.⁴¹

The spread of ISIS ideology itself began after Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Aman Abdurrahman expressed their support for ISIS which was then followed by 23 of his followers, mostly were prisoners of terrorism in Nusakambangan prison. Ba'asyir even stated that if he could not join the jihad to support ISIS, at least he would join MIT or MIB, because both have the same ideology. Ba'asyir's support of ISIS then resulted in a split in JAT. A JAT core figure named Muhammad Achwan had a different attitude from Ba'asyir. He decided not to ally with ISIS. Because of this, Ba'asyir asked Achwan to leave the JAT ranks. Achwan then stated that he came out of JAT and formed a new da'wah group called Jamaah Ansharul Syariah (JAS). Even so, Achwan still believes that the establishment of the *Khilafah* is part of the Islamic obligation. In the subsquence stage, JAT then formed Jemaah Ansarul Khilafah (JAK) which had a different orientation with JAS. If JAS refuses to provide support and loyalty to ISIS, JAK will instead take allegiance to ISIS. Although, in essence, both have the same goal, namely the enforcement of Islamic law according to their respective versions.

The above description illustrates that the development of radicalism in Indonesia originates from an ideology that is designed from a literal understanding of Islamic Sharia values, which is then produced and distributed to the public with the aim of developing the Daula Islamiyah social order. This movement, in its action, craves total and revolutionary change by drastically reversing existing values through violence and extreme actions. It is from this then radicalism became the forerunner to the birth of terrorism.

D. Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: Between Political Response and Trans-national Ideology

Some analysts view the development of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia as the response of some Muslims to the social and political realities of Indonesia, triggered by economic and structural injustices and

⁴¹ "Evolusi ISIS Di Indonesia" (Institut for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), September 24, 2014): 7.

inequalities that cause dissatisfaction with the government. The response spread in the community and eventually formed a social organization based on religion. Hadiz and Robison consider that oligarchs cause divisions between Muslims who have access to politics because they have capital and Muslims who do not have capital, even though both have the same idealism and enthusiasm to bring change and get out of the structural poverty they face.⁴²

Similar to the above view, Amin Rais concluded that the material problem was one of the factors that led to the emergence of groups wanting radical political change because the oligarchy that was built only gave birth to gaps. Strictly speaking, the idea of an Islamic State is only an alternative to the so-called "radical" Muslims because the current state model adopted by Indonesia has not yet been able to bring prosperity to the people in general. In a broader context, the urge to carry out bombings, change the system of the state, and so forth, arises from two reasons. *First*, because the state is not able to provide rights for those who are trapped by structural poverty. *Second*, because some Muslims in Indonesia have genealogically strong roots in the struggle against the presence of foreign corporations and neoliberal oligarchies embraced by the political regime which is now considered as "pseudo occupation" or "state-captured corruption".⁴³

The same opinion was expressed by Lay who considers that the energy of vandalism or violent behavior committed sporadically in certain cases is a negative impact of the failure of the state to fulfill the rights of its citizens. Three elements cause the problem of collective violence and the energy of vandalism: *First*, the State oppression against the people. *Second*, the insecurity of citizens because of the chaos of the state institutional system, thus triggering acts against corruption of a handful of elites (oligarchs). *Third*, social injustice in society as the government misreads political development models.⁴⁴

⁴² R. Robison dan V. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004).

⁴³ Mohammad Amien Rais, *Agenda Mendesak Bangsa: Selamatkan Indonesia!* (Yogyakarta: PPSK Press, 2008).

⁴⁴ Cornelis Lay, "Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* Vol. 13, no. 1 (2009).

From Lay's analysis, it can be concluded that structural problems, both political structure, and social structure, should become a note in reading "Radical Islam" in a more complex way. The emergence of Radical Islam is not an ideological aspiration rooted in historical romanticism to restore the caliphate but as a response to the failure of the state in fulfilling the rights of its citizens that result in inequality. In the context of the New Order, the fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights to citizens is not running optimally due to structural problems.⁴⁵ This also means that "terrorism" in Indonesia will not be finished if the government does not fix the structural problems faced by Indonesia. In other words, neoliberalism, in its various forms and faces in Indonesia, needs to be resolved so that groups that use violence as a struggle strategy can be muted through the awareness of the perpetrators of violence themselves. This is what became known as non-violent activism. The dimension of radicalism must be kept away from the energy of anarchy so that radicalism does not end in the use of violence.⁴⁶

Activism can be manifested in other efforts that do not harm those not involved in terrorism. The eradication of terrorism does not necessarily impede the freedom of expression of citizens. A culture and a peace strategy are needed to promote non-violent activism. Therefore, the issue of Radical Islam needs to be read more comprehensively. The assumptions that initially identified terrorism through Radical Islamic ideology need to be reevaluated to its roots so that there are no misguided thoughts and generalizations in seeing the discourse of terrorism. Even if one views "Radical Islam" as a threat, the main thing that needs to be done is to overcome the structural-economic gap in Indonesia. The issue of Radical Islam is not only an ideology that justifies violence but also a result of structural injustices and inequalities. If in the New Order era there was interference from the regime that form "radical" discourse, then in post-

⁴⁵ Revisond Baswir, *Pembangunan Tanpa Perasaan: Evaluasi Pemenuhan Hak Sosial, Ekonomi dan Budaya* (Jakarta: Elsam, 1999).

⁴⁶ John Perkins, *The Confession of an Economic Hit Men, Pengakuan Seorang Ekonom Perusak*, trans. Herman Tirtaatmadja and Dwi Karyani (Jakarta: Abdi Tandur, 2004): 123.

New Order radicalism was formed by dissatisfaction with the oligarchic government.⁴⁷

Furthermore, the existence of transnational ideology also influenced the development of radicalism in Indonesia. Vedi R. Hadiz's analysis of "Islamic Populism" as the basis of Radical Islamic ideology shows that there is a class imbalance as the root of the phenomenon of radicalism. This is not only happening on a national scale but also international. The existence of a process of transnational activity causes the awareness of the Muslim class to increase. As a result, radicalism which was originally only a symptom in the Middle East now also becomes a symptom in Indonesia.⁴⁸

The ideological Islamic Sharia that is offered is believed to have a strong basis for realizing prosperity based on Islamic law. By using this perspective, terrorism is not considered a mismatch between Islam and the West. On the contrary, it should be defined as an excess of social inequality due to bourgeois exploitation of capital. But, how is this related to the transnational movement?

Almost all of the Islamic political movements in the Middle East have the same background: a response to oppression. Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, once said that the characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood sermon were anti-cruelty with the primary role of young people in it.⁴⁹ Likewise, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani called for an end to injustice within the framework of the Islamic Khilafah. Thus, the existence of the groups mentioned as "Radical Islam" is not an extension of the Islamic movement in the Middle East; Their relationship with the Iqwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir movements is more caused by the common vision and perception of social change within the political and legal framework of Islam. In other words, transnationalism that occurs is more a mere transmission of ideas.

⁴⁷ Robison and Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets...*: 304.

⁴⁸ Vedi R. Hadiz, *Islamic populism in Indonesia and the Middle East* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

⁴⁹ Shadiq Amin, *Mencari Format Gerakan Dakwah Ideal*, trans. by. Syarif Ridwan (Jakarta: Al-I'tishom Cahaya Umat, 2006): 27.

At this point, the emergence of the "Radical Islam" movement should no longer be understood as "Talibanization", "Wahabi", or "Transnational Islam", but originated from the repression of the New Order which silenced Islam as a political force. Radical Islam is only a symbol of distrust against an authoritarian regime that silences the voice of the people.

Like the pre-modern Salafi movement (neo-Salafi), the modern Salafi movement also has a common orientation, inviting people to re-implement Islamic sharia. Besides, this movement also seeks so that people can face existing modernity while still being guided by the Qur'an and previous teachings that guide the Salaf. The trick is to interpret past events and relate them to the present to get wisdom, lessons, and solutions for various problems in various fields.

Conceptually, Salafi teaches the good of all people to live in a life based on Islamic values, culture, and law, without being interfered with by local cultural traditions or the influence of Western secular ideas and values. For modern Salafists, attention to politics began to grow as a reaction to the secular movement that had continued to develop since the independence era. The reaction then developed as an understanding of the body of the Islamic movement in the world and the da'wah movement.

Salafis, that later joined other Islamic political movements, were also motivated by different interpretations in seeing the social and political conditions around them. Their interpretation and actions are a reaction to conditions they considered deviate/come out of Islamic teachings. These reactions vary, ranging in the form of efforts to increase da'wah by peaceful means and negotiations to certain actions that cause fear in the community. From these forms of reaction, the Salafi movement can be divided into three types namely: puritanical, political and jihadist.

Puritan Salafis focus on developing da'wah that prioritizes peace and efforts to educate and purify Islamic values in the lives of modern Muslims. The entry of Salafis in the field of education automatically has an impact on the increasing number of foundations and learning institutions such as Islamic boarding schools established by Salafi activists; Salafi politicians, on the other hand, try to apply Salafi creed in the political world which is considered an important part of social life and believe that only

God has the highest authority. Whereas Salafi jihadists believe that the injustice, poverty and other social problems caused by the current government require solutions that they think can eliminate the cause of the problem by legitimizing acts of violence.

In short, the conflict between the Salafi and the government is not in the name of the Salafi teachings, but in the form of an Islamic movement followed by efforts to establish an Islamic state. While the Salafi conflict with the community stems from a lack of public understanding of the teachings spread by Salafi activists, as well as the influence of certain groups who dislike them and ultimately lead to a negative stigma against the Salafis by labeling them as extremist groups associated with the Wahabi movement in the name of the Salafis.⁵⁰

D. Conclusion

Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has existed since the early days of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia which was marked by the emergence of the Darul Islam (DI) movement as a result of disappointment and at odds with the Indonesian government, especially regarding the form of the state. In the next stage, this movement expanded widely which was marked by the emergence of several religious groups such as Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Although it must be admitted that ideologically the movements were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi transnational understandings, their appearance was more due to dissatisfaction with the socio-political conditions which they considered far from ideal. []

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⁵⁰ Ibid. ... : 207

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