



The Identity Politics of “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community

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Abstract : *This article aims to show the forms of diversity and religious identity contestation of millennial generation actualized through Islamic popular culture. In Indonesia, Islamic popular culture frequently emerges in segment of urban society that invariably accomodates, negotiates, and redefines modernity in Islamic visual-ceremonial activities. Identity and existence become main characteristics on how the millennials reexamine their Islamic notions. This research is a combination of theoritical and empirical research by using phenomenology approach. The sources of this research are collected through bibliography study and field work, while the research object is “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community Bandar Lampung. As a result, this study discovers the existence of “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community is much sustained by the presence of the Muslim-middle class. In addition their identity capitalization is constructed in three main pillars, namely the capability to select market of da’wah, language as a means of confirmation, figure as the magnet. The identity campaign via new media framing renders “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community as an alternative to learn religion for the millennials.*

Keywords : *Political Identity, New Media, Hijrah Community, Popular Culture*

Abstrak : *Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menunjukkan bentuk-bentuk keragaman dan persaingan identitas keagamaan generasi milenial yang diaktualisasikan melalui budaya populer Islam. Di Indonesia, budaya populer Islam sering muncul pada lapisan masyarakat urban yang selalu mengakomodir, menegosiasikan, dan meredefinisi modernitas dalam aktivitas visual-seremonial Islam. Identitas dan eksistensi menjadi ciri*

utama bagaimana kaum milenial mengkaji ulang gagasan keislaman mereka. Penelitian ini merupakan perpaduan antara penelitian teoritis dan empiris dengan menggunakan pendekatan fenomenologi. Sumber penelitian ini dikumpulkan melalui studi kepustakaan dan kerja lapangan, sedangkan objek penelitiannya adalah Komunitas Hijrah “Yuk Ngaji” Bandar Lampung. Hasilnya, studi ini menemukan bahwa keberadaan Komunitas Hijrah “Yuk Ngaji” banyak ditopang oleh kehadiran kelas menengah Muslim. Selain itu, kapitalisasi identitas mereka dibangun dalam tiga pilar utama, yaitu kemampuan memilih pasar dakwah, bahasa sebagai alat konfirmasi, dan figur sebagai magnet. Kampanye identitas melalui framing media baru menjadikan Komunitas Hijrah “Yuk Ngaji” sebagai alternatif belajar agama bagi kaum milenial.

Kata Kunci : Politik Identitas, Media Baru, Komunitas Hijrah, Budaya Populer

A. Introduction

The collapsing of New Order regime which had reigned for more than three decades and brought about economical crisis in 1997 as its domino effect had escorted Indonesian society in phase of the maze. In the post-authoritarian period, it not only raised up the empty of chronic-political authority, but also paved a way of religious diversions among Indonesian Muslims.¹ By and large, Muslims in Indonesia have been classified as “smiling Islam” and “angering Islam” to make a differentiation or label for “moderate Islam” in one side and “radical Islam” in another side. Apart from such categorization, in fact, this largest Muslim country in the world is prevalently associated with the face of tolerant and peaceful Islam.²

However, this decent supposition dramatically changed as a consequence of bloody incidents such as Bali Bombing in October 2002 and other terrorism actions as well. This fact increasingly gained a legitimation when the rupture of religious and sectarian conflicts harshly occurred in some regions like Ambon, Poso, Sampang, and Halmahera, with which it had caused countless-material damage and thousand of death. Thus the issues of terrorism and security become the main concern echoed

¹ Ariel Heryanto, *Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia*, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2015), 23.

² Kersten noted there are polarisation and struggle of discourse divided into two groups, namely moderate and extremist. See. Carool Kersten, *Berebut Wacana: Pergulatan Wacana Umat Islam Era Reformasi*, 1st ed. (Bandung: Mizan, 2018), 38-74.

by many researchers to view the shift of Muslim character in contemporary Indonesia. Even, their research is excessively driven by such terrorism and security issues and, at the same time, it disregards the pivotal studies outside both.

Interreligious conflicts occurred after the falling of New Order regime have distinctly agglomerated Islamic identity and raised up the attraction of Islamism in Indonesia. Coagulation of identity that lately takes place, according to Bagir, is fueled by people’s inability in facing modernity signified by the advance of economics, science, and technology.³ As tremendous impacts, people lose control on what they have created. In one hand, modernity has successfully made extraordinary progress, particularly in the field of science, technology, and technocrat. On the other hand, however, it also has led the feature of dismal humanity, namely arid personality from spirituality.⁴

The presence of modernization in stage of human history has brought about unsteadiness of constancy of Muslim’s religious identity and forced them to seek moral certainty in the future.⁵ By utilizing the new digital media, some Islamist groups offer the attractive middle ways and it is needed by (young) Muslims in order to be pious in the digital age.⁶ Pious identity in such era is often shown as the model of a luring modern Muslim that is properly imitated with unquestionably intellectual, moral, and spiritual awareness. They aspire to be part of educated people and citizens who are also close to Islamic narration, modern life style, creativity, and global consumption.

This study specifically intends to observe the current development of dynamics of Muslim’s life, particularly the millennial generation, how they compete to shape an Islamic identity as part of their piety in public sphere, more than normatively actualizing the pillars of Islam. Based on the

³ Haidar Bagir, “Born Again dan Semangat Zaman Mencermati Fenomena Hijrah,” Mizan, 2019, <http://www.mizan.com/born-again-dan-semangat-zaman-mencermati-fenomena-hijrah>.

⁴ Haedar Nashir, *Agama dan Krisis Kemanusiaan Modern* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1997), 138.

⁵ Greg Fealy, “Mengonsumsi Islam: Agama yang Dijadikan Jualan dan Kesalahan yang Diidam-Idamkan di Indonesia,” in *Ustadz Seleb: Bisnis Moral dan Fatwa Online, Ragam Ekspresi Islam Indonesia Kontemporer*, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2012), 15–37.

⁶ Shelina Janmohamed, *Generation M: Generasi Muda Muslim dan Cara Mereka Membentuk Dunia*, 1st ed. (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 2017), 12.

quest of a spiritual meaning, the discussion in this paper focuses on commodification of Islam that embodies in popular culture and its implication on the formation of millennial generation's religious identity. In Indonesia, the millennials express their faith identity with myriad ways. Pilgrimage to holy places, for instance, ensues in a scale that has no precedence before. This fact definitely cannot be separated from attribute of modernity like the rise of commercialization, technology of information, and transportation.⁷

In this regard, the millennials are a part of global Muslim community that is significantly growing and feeling comfortable with creed and modern life. They are youths who are intimate with technology in one hand, and experience dehydration of religiosity on the other hand. They expect the best thing from life without necessarily compromising with Islamic family background.⁸ They are proud of being a Muslim and apply it to interact with their social circumstances. They become the creator of a trend in Muslim global population in the world. Janmohamed calls such phenomena as a new Muslim wave that performs modernity aspects through faithful lense.⁹

The new Muslim wave that is not outrageously burdened with certain social backgrounds eventually makes them as a new ideological wave which appears with the attractive jargon. One of jargons that can mesmerise the millennial generation is "*Hijrah* phenomena". In the reins of the millennials, *Hijrah* does not merely undergo the shift of lexical meaning, but also becomes a trend of change of an individual's Islamic identity marked by the change of attitude, fashion style, and rites as a symbol of change from their self. *Hijrah* has altered the face of Islam from set of ritual, faith, and doctrine to the symbolic commodity that is relevant with demands of class, life style, modesty, and pleasure. Some are, even,

⁷ George Quinn, "Melempar Uang di Pintu Suci: Ziarah Lokal di Jawa dari Sudut Pandang Komersial," in *Ustadz Seleb: Bisnis Moral dan Fatwa Online, Ragam Ekspresi Islam Indonesia Kontemporer*, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2012), 59–73.

⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Menuju Islamisme Populer," in *Literatur Keislaman Generasi Milenial: Transmisi, Apropriasi, dan Kontestasi*, ed. Noorhaidi Hasan, 1st ed. (Yogyakarta: Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 2018), 1–28.

⁹ Janmohamed, *Generation M: Generasi Muda Muslim ...*, 12-13.

willing to leave their work for the sake of following what they call “total Hijrah”.¹⁰

Paying attention on the aforementioned facts, it is quite interesting to more deeply elaborate how *Hijrah* becomes the trend of social change as well as construction of Islamic identity and ideology of the millennials. In this respect, the researcher deems there is a space that has not been examined on how “*Yuk Ngaji*” Hijrah Community constitutes the configuration of identity and creates the trend of social change among the millennials. By the way of field work research and based on theoretical exploration, the researcher delves logic probabilities reflected from *Hijrah* phenomena that are, in this context, much played by the millennials from the urban Muslim-middle class.

This research is the combination of theoretical and empirical research with phenomenology as its approach. The resources of research are collected through bibliographical study and field work. The researcher explores books, articles, academic thesis, research reports from qualified research institutions, and documentations from relevant media, particularly social media and website that are nationally published by “*Yuk Ngaji*” Hijrah Community itself. The main source of this research is the field work research which has taken place for six months.

Based on data gathered in the field and completed by theoretical framework, such data are then analyzed circularly and taken a synthesis by step of triangulation. Through that theoretical lense, this study offers an empirical analysis on how “*Yuk Ngaji*” Hijrah Community is established and developed in society. At the same token, this study also tries to shift a focus on research of Islamic social movement from Islamic ideology to the issues related to such community.

B. Genealogy of the Middle Class in Indonesia

One of the props of the millennial generation’s existence thru “*Yuk Ngaji*” Hijrah Community is the urban Muslim-middle class. In 1990, in *Prisma Magazine*, Ariel Heryanto had formulated the concept of the middle class in Indonesia. Though he admits that such formulation does not propose the concept of a reliably theoretical base, but, at least, it can

¹⁰ Yuyun Sunesti, Noorhaidi Hasan, and Muhammad Najib Azca, “Young Salafi-Niqabi and Hijrah : Agency and Identity Negotiation,” *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 8, no. 2 (2018): 173–97.

help to grasp the discourse of middle class in Indonesia. The researcher regards such formulation in parallel with condition of Muslim-middle class in Indonesia today.

Literature account on the middle class in Indonesia is, according to Heryanto, divided into four categories of issues: (1) empiric; (2) conceptual-theoretic; (3) epistemology; and (4) discursive.¹¹ *The first*, it focuses on the attention to historical observation about who is classified as the middle class, historically from time to time, their range of quantity, up to their education level, life style, and job. *The second*, it relates to conceptual formulation so that it can be used as theoretical study and become significant components in developing theoretical framework.

The third, it is about the issue of epistemology. The main discussion related to it is the nature of concept and meaning of middle class itself. The matter in this realm is more abstract and fundamental than conceptual-theoretic problem. Meanwhile, as *the fourth*, discursive group endeavors to see a social significance of the middle class itself.¹²

Heryanto deeply defines the middle class as conceptual construction that can be logically maintained, referring to abstract thing; an element in social structure.¹³ Unfortunately, life style, education literacy, level and pattern of consumption frequently become the salient reference of literature used in Indonesia to conceptualize the middle-class. Defining it merely as the empirical measure, range of quantity, prosperity, wealth, education level, mobility and life style, according to Heryanto, can make us obscure to the essential conception on the middle-class. In this regard, the researcher, therefore, agrees that the middle class can be more acceptably understood as the discursive, ideological, and mythical concepts than the pure empirical descriptions.

In Indonesian literature, the study of the middle class is mostly dominated by empirical studies, at least until the 1990s. Even so, however, the empirical studies of the middle class in Indonesia are not too boring due to many perspectives available. Raharjo Jati, for instance, duplicates

¹¹ Ariel Heryanto, "Kelas Menengah Indonesia: Tinjauan Kepustakaan," *Majalah Prisma* (Jakarta, 1990), 52-53.

¹² *Ibid.*, 54-55.

¹³ Ariel Heryanto, "Intelektual Publik, Media, dan Demokratisasi: Politik Budaya Kelas Menengah di Indonesia," in *Menggugat Otoriterisme di Asia Tenggara*, ed. Ariel Heryanto and Sumit K. Mandal, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2004), 49-118.

Max Weber’s thought to buttress epistemological building to trace the genealogy of the religiosity-based middle class. He argues that the emergence of the middle class genealogically can be observed from Weber’s work about relation of religion and spirit of capitalism. He uses Weber’s perspective to analyze the advent of the religious based-middle class.¹⁴

According to Raharjo Jati, transformation of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia began with the shift from cultural Islam to political Islam since before independence. Set apart from the middle class in the West which was formed in a organized way through the Protestant Calvinist Sect, the Muslim middle class in Indonesia, in contrast, was disorganized and tended to be partial. The historical evidence to strengthen it could be culturally traced back to the emergence of *new petty bourgeois*, before finally transforming to political Islam through an organization of the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* or SDI. In its development, SDI metamorphosed to the *Sarekat Islam* or SI. This change then marked the orientation shift of SI to be more fundamentalist.¹⁵ As the yield of complexity arised in the end, SI as the association of political Islam movement supported by the Muslim middle class began to lose the articulation of its objectives. It was caused by the advent of two opposing factions that, in one side, desired SI as a political radical force, but on the other side, did not want it. As aftermath of such dispute, the Muslim middle class movement under flag of SI was trapped in impasse. In this respect, Raharjo Jati assessed the struggle of the Muslim middle class had shifted from a political Islam to a civil Islamic movement. A movement subsequently organized a lot of Islamic *da’wah* by combining Islam and modernity through the means of popular culture. They played an important role to prop Islamic populism existence in Indonesia.¹⁶

C. Hijrah: the Millennial Generation’s New Islamic Trend

For the millennial generation, practicing the Islamic way means enclosing awareness of God in each aspect of life and trying to imitate the

¹⁴ Wasisto Raharjo Jati, *Politik Kelas Menengah Indonesia*, 1st ed. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2016), 34-43.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 53-55.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-65. See also Heryanto, *Identitas dan Kenikmatan...*, 40-48.

Prophet Muhammad PBUH.¹⁷ Ogilvy Noor has conducted a research over the condition of Muslims around the world. As quoted by Janmohamed, Noor's research found that more than ninety percent of the millennials revealed that their faith will affect their consumption and life style.¹⁸ While others see the limits in religious rules, they, instead, consider those as an opportunity to completely create global productions and services. The necessity to live in keeping with Islamic life style eventually stimulates the presence of new ideas and creativities. Those subsequently grow up in four major categories, namely food, finance, medicine, and entertainment.¹⁹ Hasan further identifies that such categories develop in various realms such as garment production, supermarket, publishing and banking.²⁰

The Millennials have huge influences on multiple aspects of personal, social, cultural, economical, political, and religious lives. They also go into Islamic literatures which are different from prior generation. The *Da'wah* style found by them in public seems more attractive and open, not too rigid and more permissive with the limits in accordance to shari'a. They acquire chances to express ideas more than conventional ways in articulating Islam.²¹ Nurcholish Madjid called this phenomena as "*santrinisasi*" that appeared as a consequence of education taken by Muslims after independence. The millennials' Islamic stance gradually metamorphoses when followed by the advent of information and communication technology that makes the world more transparent.

The primacy of the millennials is they realize that they need a solution and they do not have to wait others to do.²² They also cannot be dictated only by religious inheritance derived from family or certain Islamic organizations. It is because they experience a phenomenon called as "hybridization of identity" that is an amalgamation of cultures, traditions, values, and principals held by society as the impact of intensive interaction

¹⁷ Dawn B. Valentine and Thomas L. Powers, "Generation Y Values and Lifestyle Segments," *Journal of Consumer Marketing* Vol. 30, no. 7 (2013): 597–606,

¹⁸ Janmohamed, *Generation M: Generasi Muda Muslim ...*, 76.

¹⁹ Alfonso Vargas-Sánchez and Mirko Perano, "Halal Tourism through the Lens of Generation Z in a Muslim Majority Country: Implications on Tourist Services," *International Journal of Business and Management* 13, no. 9 (2018): 36.

²⁰ Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Making of Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere," *Contemporary Islam* 3, no. 3 (2009): 229–50.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Janmohamed, *Generation M: Generasi Muda Muslim ...*, 78.

process among individual or community in the context and tradition that exist surrounding them.²³ These facts insist the Millennials to always be accomodative toward new values acquired both from family, society, and educational institution. Thus the Millennials’ identity is unique. It is due to in process of seeking values, they determine their own views in adopting knowledge used as legitimation to respond actual situation.

The changing of unusual face in Islamic rituals amidst the millennials makes them difficult to be indoctrinated and live with their own mindset. The distinction looks like a satisfaction in their mind and also becomes a new trend of their Islamic feature. We can observe such inclination from the way in which they put forward themselves in trendy styles, but, at the same time, still carry out the spirit of Islam as a cover. Syar’i cloth, for instance, comes with the variety of innovations that are part of acculturation of old mode and modern style. As a result, they are no longer feeling alienated when wearing sarongs, turbans, robes, headscarves, and other symbols. The sorts of cloths which are previously identified as theological symbol are redesigned by rendering a new touch with a model based on their interest.²⁴

The style of da’wah (preaching) also does not escape from transition. They provide creative touches in peculiar ways. In the case of Islamic sermon (*pengajian*), for example, they design the event more attractive by holding religious agendas like the grand concerts or festivals. Da’wah performances are also packaged in modern ways such as a podcast, sport, and art performing out of conventional manners. The way in grasping Islam also undergoes the change that makes public gawk. Not only from circumstances of the family, educational institution, friendship and organization that motivate the Millennials to learn religion, the most influential for them, however, precisely comes from the internet and new digital media. Sermon forums (*majelis taklim*) are replaced by online groups in social media that convincingly present religious knowledge and dogma.²⁵ This makes them eclectically religious, even hybrid. In this

²³ Chaidar S. Bamualim et al., *Kaum Muda Muslim Milenial: Konservatisme, Hibridasi Identitas, dan Tantangan Radikalisme*, Edited by Chaidar S. Bamualim, Hilman Latief, and Irfan Abubakar, (Jakarta: CSRC, 2018), 69-72.

²⁴ Ali Ja’far, “Digital Piety and The Transformation of Political Activism of Youth Hijrah Movement,” *Al-Tabir; Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 20, no. 2 (2020): 329–50,

²⁵ Muhammad Wildan, “Aksi Damai 411-212, Kesalehan Populer, dan Identitas Muslim Perkotaan Indonesia,” *MAARIF Institute for Culture and Humanity* 11, no. 2 (2016): 188–202.

context, the process of hybridization is taking place as the implication of encounter and interaction with many sources of study, social group, and environment.²⁶

Social media and the Millennials are like two sides of a coin in which both are too close and inseparable. The ustadz who are “digital friendly” are easier to accept them because the Millennials can easily access wherever and whenever they want. Social media has spawned a number of new figures who are very popular or commonly called as “Ustaz Viral”.²⁷ The names such as Hanan Attaki, Adi Hidayat, Abdul Somad, Felix Siaw and the names in regional level such as Evi Effendi and Jujun Junaidi in West Java and Salim A. Fillah in Yogyakarta have been the cyber superstars for those who are in process to seek for an identity. Search engine quickly helps to find what they want in just using one tap. They can also listen from far distance and play over their favorite Ustaz or Ustzah videos.

Not merely new digital media as a new form of Islamic literature that develops among the Millennials, Kailani, instead, identifies that there are other things which are more massive. He argues that the Millennials’ Islamic literature is also provided in the form of fictions, popular books, motivations, and comics. Those offer daily themes and various Islamic practical guidances in life with short narration, simple language not dominating and equipped with evocative illustrations.²⁸ By using such ways, they experience a process of contextualization and appropriation. In that way so, they also understand market’s desire and culture identity that encourage them no longer easy to be carried away from certain ideology, particularly for those who want to dictate and direct them with blurry choices.

D. “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community: the New Face of Popular Islamism

Lexically, *Hijrah* means “to migrate”, “to immigrate”, or “to leave one’s native country”. In Indonesian dictionary, it is explained that the

²⁶ Mohammed A. Bamyeh, “Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North,” *Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews* 41, no. 1 (2012).

²⁷ Bamualim et al., *Kaum Muda Muslim Milenial...*, 87-93.

²⁸ Najib Kailani, “Perkembangan Literatur Islamisme Populer di Indonesia: Apropriasi, Adaptasi, dan Genre,” in *Literatur Keislaman Generasi Milenial: Transmisi, Apropriasi, dan Kontestasi*, ed. Noorhaidi Hasan, 1st ed. (Yogyakarta: Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 2018), 143–72.

meaning of word “*Hijrah*” means the budge of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH from Mecca to Madinah to avoid the attack from Quraisyh elites in 622 AD. Along with the development of epoch, an event interpreted as *Hijrah* begins to undergo the expansion of meaning and be understood as the moral shift, namely the effort to change the self to be better than before by improving moral-spiritual aspects in the inner-self.²⁹

In the context of Islamic popular culture, terminology of *Hijrah* has become an ideological slogan and transformed to popular discourse among the Millennials. Proponents of this *Hijrah* discourse is closely related with the group actions who are keen to echo their ambition to change the legal state system into the chaliphate system. The proliferation of this movement, according to Hasan, cannot be segregated from the role of Islamic fundamentalist movements such as Muslim Brotherhood or *Ikhwanul Muslimin* founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in Eygpt in 1923, and followed by the call for Islamic revolution initiated by Abul A’la al-Mawdudi (1903-1978) through Jami’at-i Islami in Indo-Pakistan region.³⁰ In Indonesia, *Hijrah* trend is not only more ideological, but also represents the identity movement of Islamic politics such as Salafi,³¹ Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and other Tarbiyah movements that have akin mission as transnational Islamic ideological movements.³²

However, *Hijrah* movement gradually looks like a virus that infects Muslims undergoing the crisis of identity and questing of the creed. It has been the fascinating phenomenon, particularly for the urban middle-class millennials. It appears in segmentation of urban society that reaccomodates, renegotiates, and redefines modernity in faithful frame. In particular, we can highlight the millennials who live in urban areas by using three characteristics: being pious Muslims with the variety of religious identities that underlie on moral foundation; being respectable and responsible citizens; being members of the global producer-consumer

²⁹ Sunesti, Hasan, and Azca, “Young Salafi-Niqabi and Hijrah ...,”

³⁰ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian Identitas Pasca-Orde Baru*, 1st ed. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008), 31-80. See also. Hasan, “Menuju Islamisme Populer.” ..., 4-9.

³¹ Oki Setiana Dewi, “Pengajian Selebritas Hijrah Kelas Menengah Muslim (2000-2019): Respon Atas Dakwah Salafi dan Jamaah Tabligh” (Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, 2020).

³² Wahyudi Akmaliah, “Arus Balik Hijrah,” Detik News, 2019, https://news.detik.com/kolom/4439584/arus-balik-hijrah?fbclid=IwAR0rHBWYugFC7cfyupvczY0SYyhDhQf5DoaoBj9WSmjFAkQ_4R_ret1_rIE.

community.³³ Identity, existence, and the spirit of self-capitalization are disposition on how they recycle their Islamic consideration.

The turmoil of Hijrah in the midst of postmodern society has pushed many Muslim thinkers to reinterpret dynamic aspects of religious life. One of the efforts conducted by them is reinterpretation of the *Hijrah* in the context of globalization faced by all people today. In exclusive interview with Haidar Bagir,³⁴ a Muslim scholar who has been crowned as one of the 500 most influential Muslim figures in the world according to The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Center, reveals that the Islamic trend named as *Hijrah* has existed since 1980, even more early since the mid-1970, definitely with the diverse orientations. Bagir's thesis is strengthened by Nurcholish Madjid's findings that indicated initial disputes related to the *Hijrah* movement actually have emerged since the early-1950. It was marked by the resurrection of the Muslim middle class,³⁵ namely *santri* who not only played a role to be the gatekeeper of *Ulama Salaf* orthodoxy through pesantren (Islamic Boarding School), but also began to gain the access on modern education.

Different from the phenomena occurred in 1980, Bagir sees the *Hijrah* phenomena today seem more political and structurally mobilized. It enables because the religious spirit encounters with the will to solidify an identity when dealing with others (*liyan*). Meanwhile, *Hijrah* phenomena in 1980 was more dominated by religious spirit. The coagulation of identity which recently takes place is evoked by people's incapability in facing the advance of economics, science, and technology.³⁶ Due to tremendous invasions of modernity products, people precisely lose a control over what they have created. In addition the transformation marked by accessible access on information brings about the influences coming from outside can penetrate each person's wall and cross each spatial distance and also relieve social disparity that in turn multiply uncertainty.³⁷

Therefore, it arises the anxiety that good things will be eroded due to the direct impact of changing global world. Such worry subsequently

³³ Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, "Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times," in *Being Young and Muslim: New Culture Politics in the Global South and North*, ed. Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3–26.

³⁴ Bagir, "Born Again dan Semangat Zaman Mencermati Fenomena Hijrah."

³⁵ Heryanto, "Intelektual Publik, Media, dan Demokratisasi...."

³⁶ Bagir, "Born Again dan Semangat Zaman Mencermati Fenomena Hijrah."

³⁷ Hasan, "Menuju Islamisme Populer" ..., 10.

forms an accumulation of attitude to build a barrier for their identity. In the West, they actualize it through anti-immigrant policy while in Indonesia it is represented by the segregation between the Native and the Non-Native that, when reaching the peak of extreme level, it comes into phobia against other groups. In this sense, the *Hijrah* trend has transfigured to populism movements as an integral part of popular Islamism “project”: the movements actively initiated mostly by commercial preachers and urban middle class Muslims.³⁸ They undertake to integrate Islamic values through the spirit of democracy and modern popular culture.

In terminology popularized by Asef Bayat, he calls such phenomena as “post-Islamism” in which it is inseminated in the recognition of the secular existence, escaping from the rigidity, and abolishing monopoly practices of religious truth.³⁹ The emergence of post-Islamism, according to Bayat, is marked by three factors, namely (1) the collapse of Islamism as a project of political ideology evoked by the awareness of the peculiarity of system that they build when trying to be institutionalized in the form of a government; (2) the social change characterized by the raise of literacy, urbanization, and the economic change that awakens actors and shapes a collective consciousness of urban society, and insists social and political transformation; and (3) the context of global social change around the world.⁴⁰

A similar notion also stated by Oliver Roy, as quoted by Hasan, that the proponents of *Takfiri* ideology have lost the influence, particularly among the educated young generation. In this regard, the presence of new media also more increasingly reduces the level of their trust in front of authoritarian power proclaimed by Islamism. Thus post-Islamism fills such empty gap as the rooted alternative choice midst young Muslims who are so intense with new social media. Interestingly, however, those Muslim millennials do not much pay attention on the issues of Islamic state, but more focus on response toward global discourse, freedom, and being cosmopolite society.⁴¹

Islamism is, in fact, not a static ideology. The prior Islamism group imagined Islam as the complete divine system with its superior structure

³⁸ Hasan, *Menuju Islamisme Populer...*, 17-18.

³⁹ Asef Bayat, *Pos-Islamisme*, LKiS (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011), 19-20.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 180.

⁴¹ Hasan, “Menuju Islamisme Populer.” ..., 17.

and order and its adaptive system could solve all problems. Meanwhile post-Islamism is depicted as the pattern shift of the Islamist agenda from collective-revolutionary activism to individual activism that accepts the imperatives of modern life.⁴² Post-Islamism is the political trend shift in Islamic world that moves to new turn; the synthesis between discourse of Islamic resurrection stimulating the wave of Islamism and the development of modern secular education as well as market values and democratic idioms in Islamic world.

If Islamism sinks into the vortex of ideology to establish an Islamic state as the ultimate goal, post-Islamism conversely moves away from such objective and diverts attention on quotidian piety by much emphasizing on the harmonization and equity between Islam and modernity. Even so, it does not mean that the motive of post-Islamism movement is strictly different at from Islamism.⁴³ However, it is worth noting that the distinction of both rests on the acceptance of modern motives such as secularization and democracy, and the empowerment of religious ethics in society and the developing of individual piety.⁴⁴

The development of post-Islamism in Indonesia is concomitant with the growth of popular piety that infects the Millennials, particularly represented by the elite Muslim middle class as the locomotive of its early movement.⁴⁵ The popular piety is a strategy to build harmonious relationship among people without having to leave their own Islamic identity. According to Raharjo Jati, it appears due to two salient factors, namely the stigmatization of terrorism addressed to Islam and exclusive Islamic values considered too esoteric so that it makes Islam maladaptive in facing the challenge of times.⁴⁶ The popular piety is also marked by the emergence of da'wah activists who transform themselves through performance, life style, and being strengthened by some public figures who overtly create Islamic identity with variative packages.

⁴² Bayat, *Pos-Islamisme...*, 12; See also. Asef Bayat, "Post-Islamism at Large," in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*, ed. Asef Bayat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1384), 3–32.

⁴³ Heryanto, *Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia...*, 60. See Hasan, "Menuju Islamisme Populer." ..., 17.

⁴⁴ Bayat, "Post-Islamism at Large...."

⁴⁵ Heryanto, *Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia...*, 37-73.

⁴⁶ Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Kesalehan Sosial Sebagai Ritual Kelas Menengah," *Jurnal Kebudayaan Islam* 13, no. 2 (2015): 366–348.

The popular piety itself has penetrated and altered the rigid paradigm of the Islamic essence to be more open and dynamic. It is no wonder when the wave of Muslims who welcome this change is more mushrooming.⁴⁷ In this regard, Kuntowijoyo verily has predicted such situation in his collection of essays entitled *Muslim tanpa Masjid* (Muslim without a Mosque). A historian *cum* an man of letter, well-known as the pioneer of prophetic genre on Indonesian literature, clearly put forward the idea that modern urban symptoms have formed the new genealogy in interpreting Islamic da’wah.⁴⁸ This is proven by the advent of anti-mainstream da’wah epistemology. Their religious outlook is not obtained from conventional Islamic institutions such as mosques, Islamic boarding schools or individuals (Islamic preachers) such as *Kiai, Ustaz, Ulama*, and *Da’i* directly. Instead, they acquire it via cassetts, VCD, internet, radio and television.⁴⁹

Apart from the category and characteristic as above-mentioned, the da’wah podium recently has indeed undergone a transformation with presence of a number of new acrobatic strategies more than before. We can see how the *Hijrah* market has conjured public spots which are commonly used as meeting rooms, sport facilities, or wedding receptions to be attractive arenas for showing commercial preachers. The crowd agenda that mostly attracts public’s attention is usually the big event like “Hijrah Fair” held regularly.

The *Hijrah* Fair event is hosted both a number of Ustaz Celebrities or media screen figures such as Ari Untung, Hawariyyun, Mario Irwansyah (Nusa Official), ustadz Wijayanto, Handy Bonny, Faiz Ibrahim, Syakir Sula, La Ode Munafar, Sakti (ex. Sheila On7), Bobby Herwibowo, Fatih Karim, Cahyo Ahmad Irsyad and a row of names of other *Hijrah* motivators. This event is initiated by variety of Hijrah activists. In Lampung Province, one of da’wah communities who actively recruit members is “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community as a group pioneered by Muhammad Gunawan, an Ustaz and alumni of Indonesian Art Institute (ISI) Yogyakarta, who has responsibility on all activities in this community.

The “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community is a part of process from cross-religious identity among urban Muslim-middle class where the young

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*,

⁴⁸ Kuntowijoyo, *Muslim Tanpa Masjid* (Bandung: Mizan, 2001).

⁴⁹ Yunita Faela Nisa dkk., *Gen Z: Kegagalan Identitas Keagamaan*, ed. Didin Syafruddin and Ismatu Ropi, 1st ed. (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta, 2018), 11-12.

Muslims mostly come from. They succeed in changing the face of Islam in public not only in aspects of rites and doctrines, but also expressions of identity and commodity in line with consumptive behaviors. Genealogically speaking, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community was officially established on July 9, 2016. This community is a group that gathers any potency and interest across generation and profession in which its main goal is to share goodness, inspiration, knowledge, information, and others via digital media contents or directly face to face.⁵⁰

The “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community firstly held the event at the LIPI Bogor building. The founders of this community are Husain Assadi, Felix Siau, Cahyo Ahmad Irsyad, Ihsanul Muttaqin, dan Abieyasakti.⁵¹ According to Ustaz Gunawan, the initial idea that crossed founders’ mind was the same frame and awareness about country’s current situation and condition that are fraught with crucial problems. They then planned a meeting together to seek sustainable alternative solution by establishing a community. Via online media, Felix and colleagues invited netizens to meet for sharing opinion. This effort got warm and positive responses from participants. It was clearly evidenced by enthusiasm of audiences who participated in the events that were routinely held. By motto “*Obedience being Happy, Disobedience being Miserable*”, this Hijrah Community has had branches in forty towns in Indonesia.

E. Political Identity of the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community

Politics of identity is embraced by certain social groups as forms of response over injustice from state’s domination or pressure from other social groups. Discrimination such as the closing of public access undergone by certain social groups (commonly minority groups) gives rise to reaction by driving their identity as a power to struggle for their rights.

In the context of forming identity in the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community, it is shaped as the consequence of the Islamism’s shifting discourse from the struggle of Islamic politics to Islamic public. At the same time, its identity is also built due to the profeliration of Islamic popular culture as the impact of commercial industry capitalized by new

⁵⁰ Latif Ghufroan Aula and Zainul Abas, “Metode Dakwah Penceramah di Komunitas ‘Yuk Ngaji’ Solo,” *Academic Journal of Da’wa and Communication* 1, no. 2 (2020): 463–78.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*,

digital technology. This fact brings out not only the new status and new social class, but also new necessity in public sphere, culture, and religion as well.

In one hand, this change is enthusiastically welcomed by young Muslims to find themselves on par with others in terms of educational level, cultural sophistication, self-respect, and prestige without sacrificing their pride of religious piety and identity. The creed evokes a conception in their mind such as moral superiority against others, the self-assured humiliaty as feeling enlightened, or an attitude that alternates between moral supremacy and humility. On the other hand, there is a new status that raises an opinion to maintain distance between compatriots and believers that they regard less fortunate.

The presence of new preachers coming from celebrities in center of their Hijrah Community by carrying a new religious message increasingly confirms and adds their popularity. These religious figures have no formal religious education background that comprehensively learns Islamic doctrines and teachings. They usually obtain knowledge about Islamic affair informally from certain sermon place or learn with limited ustaz. Again, they have no capacity or authority to speak about Islam. Their main capability is the delightful communication skill, excellent public speaking, and the active user of new digital media.⁵²

They show the greatest new trends in speech and fashion. They satisfy the necessity of the youths, particularly coming from the middle class, who tend to take instant ways in pursuing religious knowledge or more properly being the obedient followers. These new preachers impressively speak in vernacular language, using simple and catchy phrases, sometimes making a self-mockery joke to give short and practical advices to answer many kinds of daily problems faced by the youths. The contextual matters ranging from education, relationship, food, cosmetics, religiosity, entertainment, job, to financial management become their main discussion topic.

They utilize the new modern technology which is very close among the millennials and the class of wealthy people. In addition new sufism utterances, a term coined by Howell, that contain global trends in religious thought and secular culture have attracted the millennials'

⁵² Heryanto, *Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia...*, 54-55.

attention that is still “newbie” in learning religion. The forms of such new sufism have been promoted by a means of particularly Islamic educational institutions or podcasts via sophisticated technology.⁵³ Both mediums of communication have contributed to popularize the religious passion and other Islamic attributes to the millennials.

Educational institutions have sustained the educated Muslims to plan autonomous journeys of personally spiritual development. Especially since this century, when commercial pressures on digital da’wah increased, electronic mass media has provided more duration of podcasts that are more accessible and entertaining than da’wah conducted in conventional ways.⁵⁴ A program for developing personal spirituality of new preachers in Indonesia has been managed in such a way and closed its members’ freedom to critically evaluate the dominant religious authority. Each of them proposes a compatible narration in paralel with his/her own understanding about the concept of true Islam by exploring meanings taken from authoritative texts.

In such occasion, *Ustaz Seleb*, a term usually used to refer to the preachers who have background as celebrity, promote conservative Islam in public sphere, albeit with a light touch. Even, they do not have enough capacity to speak more deeply on the issues of Islamic matters. It is not too suprising if they often get disapproval due to ignoring the common religious authority for the sake of instant ways to grasp basics of religious faith. Without encouragement to use critical-religious approach on delving religious thought, there is a risk for religious adherents to feel satisfying with his/her own embraced faith that personally limits as direct implication of the absence of adequate intellectual tools. In fact, uncritical faith is easily manipulated by certain political interests.

The success of building the *Hijrah* narrative through entertaining da’wah contents and by utilizing set of impressive new digital media makes the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community favourite for many millennials, especially in urban areas where they verily become the main target. The quiet religious path is originally esoteric, but in the hands of the *Hijrah* activists it then turns into exoteric. Such achievement definitely cannot be

⁵³ Julia Day Howell, “Variasi-variasi Kehalehan Aktif: Profesor dan Pendakwah Televisi Sebagai Penganjur Sufisme Indonesia,” in *Ustadz Seleb: Bisnis Moral dan Fatwa Online, Ragam Ekspresi Islam Indonesia Kontemporer*, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2012), 39–57.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

separated from a magnet that is able to attract constituents (*jamaah*) to immerse themselves in it. At least, there are three reasons why and how the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community succeeds in the discourse of political identity and also in conducting capitalization of their community in many big cities in Indonesia.

The first is the accuracy in reading an opportunity of da’wah market segmentation. As the effect of information access, it brings about the social change in society and the way to obtain religious knowledge also changes. In this respect, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community is precise in considering the opportunity among the millennials. They are not interested to study religion by using traditional-conventional methods. It means they do not want to study religion merely in the class, or visiting an ustaz, reciting certain holy Books, and other activity learnings that are still *fiqh*-centric oriented.

Moreover, the Millennials regard the time has changed, so that learning can be everywhere, not always in the formal-ideal place like in the class. For old generation, perhaps they still think that study religion should be in the mosque, in the Islamic boarding school, or the other places that represent religious education institutions. Meanwhile the Millennials are no longer tied by such things. This segmentation of Muslims then is captured by the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community as the field for inserting identity. For them, learning Al-Qur’an can be held in exclusive places and be packaged in forms of talkshow, seminar, podcast, *rihlah* and others which are not always related to conventional activities. Even they do not mind if each event has to pay.

One of general responses on the identity shock is to seek sources of the new moral guidance through religious spirit. When it is connected with the situation of urban Muslim-middle class, they have an intention to strengthen their faith better, but, once more, not by traditional ways. This tendency remarkably had been presupposed by Nurcholish Madjid as written in his work when discussing about phenomena like da’wah or sermon event (*pengajian*) of elite society held in luxurious hotels. It was something that is previously considered as taboo. However, what happened during Cak Nur era only addressed elite level or old generation, having not targetted the younger generation. In this context, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community succeeds to take segmentation of the Muslim millennials.

The second, the language factor. If approached from social movement perspective, a language is significant in da'wah method as used by the "Yuk Ngaji" Hijrah Community. The language is packaged and communicated in creative ways so that it seems so close with the reality of life, although contents that are conveyed are not something new. However, by making use of new approaches and new evidences, those are compatible with the Millennial style. As a real testimony, for example, when dealing with K-Pop culture, those approaches are applied by presenting the celebrity trainers who much talk about his experiences before and after taking decision on *Hijrah* way. Thus this choice successfully touches the Millennials' personality.

The facts as above-mentioned are also bolstered by the trainers from the "Yuk Ngaji" Hijrah Community within which most of them are the former of K-Poper celebrities who have repented and decided to do a *Hijrah* way, so that the contents are presented more emotional due to originating from direct experiences. Interestingly, apart from popular communication language, the pattern of interaction is constructed not by using the relation between a teacher and a student. They do not posit themselves as the ustaz, but as the trainer. In the absence of top-down communication, all seem more egalitarian.

The third, figure. It is undeniable that Felix Siaw's figure as a person who decides to *Hijrah* in which his journey of *Hijrah* to become a Muslim is full of twists. He firstly was an agnostic until he finally became a Muslim who has fully the busy hours to give sermon. For people who just study religion, it is regarded as the remarkable change, and, furthermore, Felix's figure has been the magnet for the Millennials. The similar story is also pointed out by other celebrity. Lesti Kejora, a girl who was born on August 5, 1999 in Bandung West Java, is the real example on how a young girl has to struggle to make her dream become true. Her career journey is not easy in which she has begun to seriously sing since second grade of elementary school, from one audition to another until finally gaining D'Academy champion.

Lesti began her career from someone who has nothing, but today she is ordained like a cinderella due to her stunning stage performance. In this regard, Lesti's story is merely the duplication of what is experienced by Felix Siaw. The syndrom that glorifies figures considered as the role model often occurs because Indonesian culture commonly has not moved from peternalistic characters who tend to neglect the importance of knowledge

and rationality. It is no wonder if they are simply hypnotized by something visual and cinematic. People lean to be framed by contents offering the instant and practical modes. Shortly, the emergence of the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community utilizes popular culture in its da’wah movement through which many Muslim millennials involve in it by stipulating their trainers as the role models.

While in da’wah curriculum, in spite of not as rigid as institutions of formal Islamic education, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community has the structured syllabus and, even, at every level of it has to pay. However, according to Ustaz Gunawan, one hundred percent of economical benefits gained are used for operational costs and the developing of da’wah. Currently, da’wah strategy is mostly conducted virtually via digital media such as Instagram, Youtube, Spotify, and the application of *SKY-Studi Komprehensif Yuk Ngaji* that can be downloaded in Play Store and Apple Store. Still, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community also often holds the nationally paid virtual class events such as *Yuk Ngaji Academy*, *study religion “Ngefast”*, watching and reviewing film together, and broadcasting class.

In offline da’wah programs, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community usually uses public places such as mosques, GSG (multipurpose buildings), stadiums, cafes and other places as the means of da’wah. The offline da’wah routinely held is also very diverse, ranging from weekly and monthly sermons to an annual event such as *Hijrah Fair* that has been greatly held in many big cities in Indonesia. The weekly agendas performed are different in each region. The “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community in Lampung employs the terms such as “WIBU” (*Weekand Ithor Bareng Ustadz*), “*Tanya Aja, Apa Aja*”, and “*Dear Sister (special for women)*”. The biggest offline event that has been held in Lampung is the 2019 Hijrah Fair before Covid-19 spread. Interestingly, all agendas are packaged in accordance with the Millennial Generation’s style.

F. New Media, Popular Culture, and Identity Framing

Islamization in Indonesia after New Order regime collapsed has succeeded in making Indonesian Muslims more pious in appearance. Two phenomena that can explain such transition process, according to Wildan, are pop-culture and urban middle-class Muslims. Modernization in technology and information has rapidly changed the face of Indonesian Muslims. Previously, in the first half of New Order’s rule, Muslims were

afraid to show their Islamic identity because the government was repressive. Visual forms of Islamic cultures and values almost could not exist in public sphere.⁵⁵

Along with reformation and modernization of technology and information marked by the emergence of new digital media, Islamic phenomena flourishingly begin to appear in public and electronic media as well. The piety that is originally more personal has gradually shifted to popular piety. This latter trend is a part in parcel of popular culture that accommodates variant models of notion and attitude which are completely different from common habits.⁵⁶ The popular culture as a part of media hegemony is also always supported by cultural industry which, in fact, has constructed society not only as consumers, but also industrial and commodity products.

This fact is more obvious with the presence of new digital media that can be framed in a such to drive public opinions, inform and capitalize their Islamic identity. Media framing can shape social-moral consciousness that eventually determines the audiences' perception toward the world and society where they live. What media has shown off then becomes a discourse that can bury certain group's identity and, even, change it to the ideal imaginary identity based on media's construction.

Media becomes the key in shaping representation of Muslim group identity in public. It also plays the important role of hegemony to represent and articulate the identity of young Muslims through the spirit of *Hijrah* ways. Besides that, the logic of capitalism has insisted the fulfilment of religious basic needs through religious attributes. When capitalism has been a noose to capture all human's behaviors and attitudes, consumption practices are grasped not only to meet the basic needs, but also the inheritance of activity to increase status, prestige, class, and other social symbol.

It subsequently underlies the construction of identity in media propelled by the capital groups. The resulting impacts are a desire to belong to something, either goods or services, only to fulfill the endless need for identity. Therefore, the identity of modern society is a pseudo identity built by consumption and commodity process from what mass media has

⁵⁵ Wildan, "Aksi Damai 411-212, Kesalehan Populer"

⁵⁶ Wahyudi Akmaliah, *Politik Sirkulasi Budaya Pop: Media Baru, Pelintiran Agama, dan Pergeseran Otoritas*, 2nd ed. (Yogyakarta: Buku Mojok, 2019).

provided. Meanwhile, framing is an approach to highlight how the reality is formed and constructed by media.

In the process of forming and constructing the reality, the last yield is a certain part of it which is more prominent and easier to recognize. As a result, the audience is easier to keep in mind of certain aspects that are prominently provided by media. Otherwise, non-prominent aspects not reported, are forgotten and not noticed by the audiences at all.

Entman observes the framing in two big dimensions, namely the selection of issues and the emphasizing on certain aspects of reality.⁵⁷ Such stress is a process to make information more meaningful, interesting, and simple to be remembered by people. The framing sees how reality is framed and then given to them. It can be constructed and articulated differently by media. The most basic framing effect is the complex social reality that is full dimension, irregular, and satisfies a certain logic. The framing provides a tool how the reality is created and packaged with many categories recognized by ordinary people. Thus the framing assists the audiences to access information into the familiar category.

The framing effect on *hijab* (veil), for instance, is not only as the fulfilling of obligation for a Muslim woman, but also as the representation of fashion of a modern woman. It is similar with the other forms of worship such as *umrah* with celebrities. In this sense, it seems the shift of worship meaning that contains not only ethic-spiritual, but also aesthetic-capitalist needs. In another form, *Hijrah Fair* is a part of infiltration on how the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community cultivates Islamic ideology and carries out commodification through symbolic identity of the millennials as well. The da’wah model like genre of talk show, story telling and motivation is played by soap opera star actresses who have gone through a *Hijrah* path. The way in which they deliver religious suggestions that are seemingly simple and understandable makes the millennials enchanted by materials offered by trainers. Unconsciously, they are trapped into what David Beer calls as the political vortex of new media circulation and popular culture.⁵⁸

The show which mostly attracts the Millennials’ attention obviously succeeds in inviting most the youths and also in taking

⁵⁷ Launa, “Robert Entman Framing Analysis of Prabowo Subianto’S Image in *Republika*. Co.Id March – April 2019 Edition,” *Diakom : Jurnal Media dan Komunikasi*, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2020): 50–64.

⁵⁸ David Beer, *Popular Culture and New Media: The Politics of Circulation*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

economical profits as the outcome of ticket sales and various Hijrah accessories that become the commodity. Many performances are held such as fashion show, halal-labeled culinary, and Hijrah motivation books for the youths who are in process of questing the identity. Ustaz Gunawan acknowledges that every day during *the Hijrah Fair Event* more than a thousand visitors have exchanged the entrance tickets and crowded in event area to just listen the *Hijrah* motivation. However, it is important to note that it is regrettable when such *Hijrah* momentum is merely signed by a ritual that leads to the commodity. Instead of providing the new spiritual space, the Hijrah trend, in fact, seems a just ceremony that increasingly enriches consumerism culture.

Sociologically speaking, the consumption culture of modern society is conceptualized as the most determined class experience. Through a creative agent, the symbol has been commodified in line with social status. Such commodification makes *Da'i* (preachers) look like more impressive than other profession, because, at the same time, they appear modern, progressive, and inclusive. Being religious is no longer dominated by doctrines and the after life or calling for enforcing a single truth that evidently has fostered the hatred. In the other word, the *Da'i* now is more interested in spreading the practical message on how to live modernly in which it is delivered via provocative tweets, meme snippets, interactive discussions, and other popular features.

G. Conclusion

After New Order regime collapsed, structure of media also changed. The presence of internet and new media has become a new landscape that breaks out the concentration of discourse and public knowledge. This situation is more eroded by the massive use of social media with its multiple-advanced features that not only can accelerate the production of information, but also form the new face of knowledge through memes, videos, and tweets. The advent of media framing that can be adjusted in accordance with certain passion increasingly adds the disparity of one's knowledge from the origin sources. The millennial generation as most social media users is clearly vulnerable to get impacts, either positive or negative, from the circulation of information. At the same time, internet does not come alone. It, however, carries out structural problems that make its users confused about uncertainty of the future. Anxiety handly drops in when the virtual world is often different with

reality that they feel. In this context, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community exists by bringing a new epistemology that offers a dream as well as a hope about the change of life.

With the power of new media, the narration of democratization that voices out the spirit of religiosity is louder and very rapidly spreading. By utilizing new social media, the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community succeeds in attracting the mass, particularly the millennials, in which this achievement has not been done by other groups. The intense proselytizing movement of the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community is also espoused by the attendance of viral preachers who offer ideal ways for the Millennials to explore and enjoy the glory of faith, economic enjoyment, and trendy Islamic lifestyle. The accuracy in selecting segmentation and content package designed in line with expectation and the central role of figure makes the “Yuk Ngaji” Hijrah Community simply acquire supports and benefits both ideologically and pragmatically. The other pivotal factors that should be noted here is also the support from urban Muslim middle class as the prop of the community’s existence.

However, it is yet clear what the ultimate goal of this community is. So far, it can be observed that the community’s members are merely resurrected their religious consciousness by narrating that this country is full of crucial problems, then after that, the fundamental efforts that need to be done are the motivation to consistently move together in which the matter of place to actualize it is not a problem. Hence, the structure of this community is quite heterogeneous. Even so, we can see clearly that the locomotive actors who play a significant role in this community are those who have been active in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Furthermore, if traced through its pattern of movements, its learning models and curriculums, this Hijrah community seems to have close affiliation with the former Islamist organization as previously mentioned. Yet, to certain extent, related to narration to overthrow the rulling regime or insist to change of the state legal system, those are seemingly not parts of this Hijrah community’s mission. This choice, in fact, is a way in which this community sustains and maintains its existence in public. It also becomes a mark of the limitation of scope in this research. Thus it requires the further research about religious activities of this Hijrah community specifically related to build political powers in the electoral level. [.]

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